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Earlier studies have made a distinction between two trajectories ofurbanisation in China. The first path refers to state-planned develop-ment based on large-scale industries in China’s large cities. The sec-
ond refers to towns or small city-based urban developments that rely
mainly on local initiatives and resources. (1) Laurence J.C. Ma and Ming Fan
have entitled these “urbanisation from above” and “urbanisation from
below.” (2) At the heart of both trajectories of urbanisation, though, lies the
same demographic phenomenon: migration of the farming populace away
from rural areas into urban settlements in search of jobs and a better life. 
In this article I focus on what may be perceived as a new stage of urban-
isation in China. The innovativeness of China’s new program lies in its scope,
which transcends the normal scope of the urban (expanding cities/towns
or expansion of successful villages into towns). Instead, it seeks to urbanise
the rural by imposing urban-like models of residence on rural residents,
many of whom are still farmers. As part of this, it is common that villages
are merged with other villages, and villagers are moved into townhouses or
multi-storey apartment buildings, creating a “new style” of rural residential
communities (xinxing nongcun shequ 新型农村社区) with modern facilities
and better services. Often local officials locate these new settlements ad-
jacent to rural towns, serving as de facto suburbs and embodying new kinds
of relations between rural and urban populaces by integrating both systems
(services, labour markets, governing institutions, etc.). As David Bray demon-
strates in his article in this journal issue, central and local state fiats and di-
rectives play a crucial role in determining the creation of these communities
and their appearance. This policy is still in its experimentation stage and
has mainly influenced the richer and more developed areas. Yet as this policy
gains popularity within the Party and central government as a key factor to
solving rural problems, it is not unrealistic to foresee that current experi-
ments will be further expanded nationwide. As will be observed, while urban
models of residence fit well with prosperous communities’ circumstances,
they do not match the local capabilities of less prosperous communities.
Construction of residential communities requires significant financing,
which local governments and villages may find hard to obtain. Moreover,
urban-style residential compounds are not attuned to villagers’ needs and
traditions, a much more salient issue in agricultural communities than in
industrialising ones. 
Methodology 
To investigate how the campaign of constructing rural communities was
being implemented, I conducted extensive fieldwork over the period 2009-
2011 in two counties – Chenggu County in Shandong Province and Beian
County in Anhui Province. (3) In total I studied six townships and some 20 vil-
lages in Chenggu and eight villages from six different townships in Beian. I
conducted semi-structured interviews with officials from villages, townships,
and the county level. In addition, I had numerous conversations, formal and
informal, with village residents to learn about their perceptions and attitudes.
These were mainly conducted in Chenggu, where I enjoyed better access to
villages due to research permits and better transportation facilities.
Chenggu and Beian counties share several similarities. Both are located
relatively close to provincial capitals (Jinan in Shandong and Hefei in Anhui);
both are considered the most developed counties in their prefectures and
one by no means considered poor; both are populated entirely by Han peo-
ple; and both counties contain a population of about 700,000 people. Yet
they differ significantly in terms of economic development. Chenggu is
much more developed than Beian. Its total GDP is five times higher than
Beian’s, and the incomes of Chenggu’s rural residents average 33% higher. (4)
As an industrialised county, far more villages in Chenggu have substantial
collective incomes (jiti shouru 集体收入) from land rentals and publicly-
owned enterprises. 
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ABSTRACT: The transition from traditional rural residences to urban-like multi-storey buildings and from traditional villages to rural
residential communities (shequ) is one of rural China’s most profound developments of the early twenty-first century. Official dis-
course highlights the potential benefits for villagers, portraying the new residential communities as gateways to modernity and signi-
ficant steps toward reducing inequality and disparity between the rural and the urban. Based on extensive research in two counties in
Shandong and Anhui provinces, this article concludes that while imposing urban-like models of residence may coincide with prosperous
communities’ circumstances, it may easily become a statist venture of predation and a source of tension and rural discontent in less
prosperous communities. 
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The “old” countryside – Impediments to
modernity
The emergence of a market economy in China starting in the 1980s was
accompanied by an unfortunate expansion of economic and social disparity
and inequality. The state has contributed significantly to this with its delib-
erate prioritisation of developing cities and the urban economy. Since the
early 2000s, however, the Party has been pushing towards a redefinition of
urban-rural relations. This was explicitly articulated in 2004, at the fourth
plenum of the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party (NCCPC),
where Hu Jintao raised the thesis of the “two trends” (liang ge quxiang 两
个趋向). This locates the past and the future on a prolonged path of devel-
opment, which allegedly coincides with “generalisable” trends of develop-
ment. In this account, at initial stages of industrialisation there is a general
trend for agriculture to support industries and villages to support cities.
However, after a considerable level of industrialisation has been achieved,
it is a trend to reverse these relations and push industries and cities to sup-
port rural communities. (5) According to the Party, China was ready for a
change of policy.
While the state has perceived its own role in the expansion of disparities
as reversible, it has held as officially irreversible some of the most basic
characteristics of rural life, which are deemed serious impediments to mod-
ernisation and China’s prospects of establishing a developed national econ-
omy. Yang Shisong, a member of the leadership of a municipal Party School,
points to five impediments. As this articulates official discourse, it is worth-
while recapping them one by one. 
The first point refers to life inside villages, conceptualising the villages as
“dirty (zang 脏), chaotic (luan 乱), and poor (cha 差).” Many surveys pub-
lished inside the PRC have lamented rural areas’ poor infrastructure and
public amenities. A report published by the Academy of Social Sciences in
2005, for example, found that in the early 2000s, 300 million people in rural
China still did not have permanent access to safe drinking water. (6) About
50% of the villages did not have access to running water; 40,000 adminis-
trative villages were still inaccessible by public road; and roads to 70% of
China’s villages were not paved. In more than 50% of the villages people
still used firewood and straw as sources of heating and cooking; 20 million
people were still not connected to electricity; (7) 7% of the villages did not
have access to telephones, and 50 million villagers were not connected to
TV or radio. (8)
Many villages in Beian and in the more developed county of Chenggu suf-
fered unfortunate neglect. Most roads and alleys inside the villages were
likely to be dirt, and villages became very muddy after rains. In Beian, arterial
roads between villages were dirt as well, and transport was almost impos-
sible after heavy rains or snow.
Most villages had poor hygienic environments. In many villages there was
no separation between residences and livestock-raising areas, and in Beian
the livestock wandered freely between houses in many of the villages. In
most cases, villagers used soft coal for heating. There was no heating in
many rural houses in Beian, and winter nights were very cold. Villagers used
fire wood for cooking. Flush toilets were not common and people often dis-
posed of the waste themselves. 
When entering many of the villages in both counties, the first thing no-
ticed was garbage thrown everywhere – on the main roads, in small alleys,
drainage ditches, as well as in improvised dumps on the village outskirts. In
many villages, arable land served as “empty-trash sites.” Partly as result of
villagers’ lack of concern and cultural conventions, (9) suitable means of dis-
posing of garbage in the villages was lacking. 
Villages also tended to lack cultural and leisure facilities. Public yards and
sport facilities were very old and dilapidated, if they existed at all. The main
facilities in Chenggu were the village leadership’s office, an accessible health
clinic, a small grocery shop (selling mainly dry goods), and a local agricul-
tural supplies shop. In Beian, where the administrative villages have signifi-
cantly larger populations, each administrative village had its own primary
school, (10) and some had a small hospital in addition to the village clinic.
Small-scale commerce was also more common in villages in Beian, such as
small eateries and shops selling basic daily required goods. For all other serv-
ices and needs, the people in both counties needed to travel to the rural
towns. 
Finally, villages were also likely to lack master plans to guide development.
In Beian, for example, new housing was laid out mainly in accordance with
people’s individual wishes, as long as they did not violate local construction
regulations. In Chenggu, villages had plans in place long before the call to
“build the new socialist countryside” was made. Yet, as several officials ex-
plained, these plans were very general, normally including only residential
areas, and in reality were not strictly enforced. Occasionally, the size and
shape of the housing plots was a legacy of the 1980s or earlier, and rural
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Photo 1 – A village in Chenggu County. © Lior Rosenberg
inhabitants often built their houses in a haphazard pattern with narrow al-
leys running between them. In both counties it was common to see rural
houses in various models, shapes, and sizes standing next to each other. 
Yang’s second point refers to a waste of land. China’s rapid economic de-
velopment and the erasure of previous restrictions on physical mobility have
changed traditional residential patterns in the countryside. In a period of
growing prosperity, many villagers have been building new houses for them-
selves or for their children, often occupying agricultural land. The new houses
tend to require large plots of land, as it is common for the residential com-
pounds to include private yards for daily usage. (11) At the same time, many
millions of village families have been flowing to China’s cities to take up
jobs, leaving behind houses that are empty for most or all of the year. This
emigration, according to Yang, causes a serious waste of land. 
Yang’s third point refers to the dispersed deployment of villages in the
countryside and the tendency of rural communities to be small in terms of
population size. As a result, investment in infrastructure, public amenities,
and services becomes excessively expensive, impeding the possibility of pro-
viding adequately for the needs of each locality. 
The fourth point refers to rural economic patterns that render it difficult
to adjust to the developing market economy. This includes factors such as
fragmented land (due to the tiny plots of household farming), the preva-
lence of small-scale family economic ventures, decentralisation in decision-
making, and old-fashioned business philosophy. As a whole, this hinders the
possibility of creating economies of scale and introducing new technology,
and ultimately impedes modernisation of the rural economy.   
Yang’s fifth and last point refers to the low capacity of local investment.
This is a result of low incomes and the absence of financial surpluses; un-
willingness to invest in undertakings that do not produce immediate and
direct profit or personal benefit; weakening rural community collective con-
sciousness; and increasing difficulty in forming a consensus to engage in
common undertakings and construction. (12)
The solution to these impediments, according to Yang Shisong, is the cre-
ation of a new style of rural community.
Constructing rural communities: Urbanising
the rural
In 2005, during the fifth plenum of the 16th NCCPC, a call was officially
issued to “build a new socialist countryside” (BNSC) as a far-reaching solu-
tion to rural problems. Behind this call was the acknowledgment by Chinese
policymakers that inequality and economic disparity, most notably between
the rural and urban populaces, had reached a worrisome level and could no
longer be ignored. In October 2006, at the sixth plenary session of the 16th
NCCPC, a call was conveyed to “actively promote the building of rural com-
munities” as an indispensable part of the BNSC scheme. 
The concept of communities is not new in China. The well-known Chinese
sociologist Fei Xiaotong introduced the concept of shequ in the early 1930s
as his translation of the word “community” in its sociological meaning of
Gemeinschaft. (13) The word, however, disappeared from public discourse
when sociology was banned in the early 1950s and returned to official and
scholarly discourse only in the 1980s, when sociology was rehabilitated as
a discipline. (14) In the early 2000s, the Ministry of Civil Affairs reintroduced
“communities” as a new form of administrative organisation in urban gov-
ernance. According to David Bray, the creation of urban communities was
mainly a result of the state’s inability to “meet the demand for social serv-
ices brought about by the rapid socio-economic transformation of urban
China since the mid-1980s.” (15) The solution was to create new neighbour-
hood-based administrative units in order to enable the state to regain its
capacity to manage the urban populace. 
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, a central aspect of the urban
neighbourhood community is the provision of services to its inhabitants.
According to the Ministry’s instructions, these should include: (1) welfare
services to those in need; (2) health services; (3) public cultural facilities,
activities rooms, sports and cultural events, etc. (4) beautification of the
community, enhancing cleanliness, greenification, and local awareness of
environmental protection; (5) and community policing and educating the
people to act according to the law, providing legal consultation, civil medi-
ation, obeying the policy of family planning, etc. (16) Typically, the structural
characteristics of the urban communities include (1) a scale of 1,000-1,500
households living in apartment blocks; (2) clear boundaries, often through
the creation of walled compounds; (3) and the establishment of activity
centres. (17)
As in the case of urban communities, the government introduced the re-
shaping of rural communities as a remedy to poor rural organisation and
service delivery. Unlike the cities, in which the bolstering of community life
may be viewed as innovative vis-à-vis the nature of modern cities, in Chi-
nese rural areas the notion of communal life is almost innate. (18) From an
official viewpoint, the superiority of the new rural communities over tradi-
tional rural villages lies in the larger population sizes, as authorities often
expect several villages to form a community in a new residential location.
This modern living environment among a concentrated population is sup-
posed to enable villagers to enjoy living conditions and public amenities
similar to the cities, in complete contrast to the “dirty, chaotic, and poor”
characteristics of the dispersed villages.
As David Bray observes in his article in this journal issue, urban-style
housing has become the model for the whole nation. Inside the commu-
nities, inhabitants are expected to enjoy modern housing and high acces-
sibility to services. While the responsibility for importing urban-like
models of architecture lies in the hands of the Ministry of Construction,
responsibility for services lies in the hands of the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
According to the Ministry, services entail social assistance to those in
need, maintaining public order, health care, family planning, education,
and sports. (19) The list coincides perfectly with the Ministry’s expectations
of urban communities. To ensure a high degree of accessibility, the Min-
istry’s instruction is that all services must be provided within a radius of
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no more than 2-3 kilometres from homes and no more than 20 minutes’
walking distance. (20)
Urbanising the rural in Chenggu County,
Shandong Province
The transition from traditional villages to residential communities has been
rapid in a substantial part of rural Shandong. In 2007, the Ministry of Civil
Affairs selected 251 counties nationwide to serve as experimental sites for
the creation of new rural communities, one of which was Chenggu. The two
leading provinces on this list were Shandong (34 counties) and Jiangsu (33
counties). Together these two provinces served as a vanguard, leaving the
rest of the provinces far behind. (21) By the end of 2011, the Ministry of Civil
Affairs designated 106 counties as national “model units” (shifan danwei 示
范单位) in the project of constructing the new rural communities. The leading
province by far was Shandong, with 27 model counties. (22)
Although Chenggu was not a model unit, its local officials took on com-
munities as a high priority. In 2009, the county drew up a grandiose plan in
which all of its 840-plus villages would be concentrated into 173 residential
communities. Most of these communities were to host several villages living
together. In that year, the deputy governor of Shandong Province conducted
an inspection tour in Chenggu, during which he praised the county and es-
pecially one of its wealthiest townships where the project of constructing
rural communities has developed fastest, and urged it to continue with this
project as an example for the entire province. By mid-2011, construction
had already started in 67 communities, of which 46 were in advanced stages
of construction. (23)
Interestingly, all of the village, township, and county officials in Chenggu
County to whom I spoke warmly welcomed the idea of creating rural resi-
dential communities. No doubt, provincial support for the policy and the
selection of Chenggu as an experimental site put pressure on the county to
push the construction of rural communities further. Yet it would be wrong
to attribute their support to this factor only, as the officials I interviewed
seemed to believe in the benefits of the project, and they gave several rea-
sons. First, they said, the concentration of scattered villages into higher den-
sity residential areas would facilitate provision of public amenities and
services to the villagers, a main BNSC goal. They also explained that such a
project was affordable: the county was prosperous, and in most cases the
construction of the new communities’ public areas did not burden the vil-
lagers with compulsory payments, as building was paid out of income from
the villages’ collectively owned assets, local governmental subsidies, local
publicly owned business groups, and voluntary contributions, in some cases
from the villagers themselves. 
No subsidies, however, were available for housing construction, and the
villagers were expected to pay all of the cost of their new residences. But
as land for new houses was provided free by the village, and villagers were
only required to pay for construction costs, a new rural house/apartment
cost only about 20% of the price of housing in the township and county
seats. Local officials in most townships and villages thought villagers could
afford this expense. 
Local officials’ second consideration was the need to save land. Officials
from Chenggu’s Construction Bureau estimated in 2011 that when all res-
idential communities had been fully constructed and villagers had moved
into apartment buildings, the county would be able to free 88,000 mu of
land for agricultural and industrial uses. 
It is not surprising that local officials were keen to free up land, as extra
available land is important not only for increasing household earnings,
an important BNSC goal, but also as a potential boost to local govern-
ment revenues. The abolition of rural taxes and fees in the early 2000s
crippled local rural governments’ capacity to generate revenue, so local
officials turned to land as a source of finance. Illegal seizure and selling
of villagers’ land has become a widespread phenomenon in China. When
I conducted fieldwork in Chenggu in 2011, the transition of rural inhab-
itants into residential communities had only recently begun. Officials in-
sisted that even after transformation the land would still belong to the
communities. All villagers I talked to confirmed that land remained under
their village’s control. Yet what is true today will not necessarily be true
tomorrow. Whether local officials will attempt to use or sell the new
acreage of vacant land is a matter for the future. After all, clearing land
for new factory sites in the industrialised townships can generate new
sources of revenue. 
The importance of saving land is also manifest in the need to keep a min-
imum level of agricultural land (the so-called “red line”). According to the
Law of Land Administration (1998), any occupation of agricultural land for
non-agricultural usage must be accompanied by reclamation of the same
amount of land of the same quality (article 31). Thus agricultural land recla-
mation in the county enables industrialisation on other plots of land. 
In several villages I was told by local officials and inhabitants that local
publicly owned business groups were investing in the construction of the
compact high-rise communities. Officials insisted that these local business
groups provided voluntary contributions. (24) Yet inhabitants of one of the
county’s most industrialised villages claimed that a contract had already
been signed with a local business group promising it rights to the cleared
land. According to them, the details of the contract were not transparent
and village officials had never consulted them. 
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Photo 2 – An urban-like residential community in Chenggu
County. © Lior Rosenberg
In short, land value is an important factor in the transition from villages
to residential communities. At the time of my study, local officials deliber-
ately chose first the wealthier villages, located near the county seat and in
industrialising rural townships, to move and free their land. 
Lastly, for many officials the transition from traditional rural houses to
modern apartments symbolises the transition from backwardness to moder-
nity. Many also equate lives in the villages to those in rural cities (the ulti-
mate goal of BNSC) but also to those in developed Western countries.
Clearly on this issue, though certainly not always on other topics, local of-
ficials’ views coincide with the view of the central state. 
For Chenggu officials, urbanisation in the county means the development
of rural towns and urbanised rural communities and a better integration of
these two systems. In light of this view, many of the new rural communities
are being constructed adjacent to the country towns, serving as their de
facto suburbs, sharing the towns’ services, infrastructure, and labour markets. 
Also contributing to the integration is the very good road network in the
county, which facilitates bus transportation from all of the villages/new
rural communities to the towns and the county’s economic zones. (25) Many
of the roads inside the county had already been paved in the early 1990s.
However, as a result of the national policy of paving roads between admin-
istrative villages to establish a sub-county transportation network connect-
ing villages, a second wave of road paving was launched by the county in
2003. According to the county’s statistical yearbook, in 2007 all but ten vil-
lages located in the county’s poorest township had roads accessible to cars.
Although cars are still rare in most of the villages, small motorcycles are
common and serve as a popular mode of transportation. All of the main
roads to the township seats I visited are multi-lane and well paved, and
buses run regularly all day long from the county seat to the townships. In
2004, all villages had already been connected to the bus network, offering
the villagers bus services to both the township towns and the county seat.
In 2010, the county government announced a new policy under which buses
were to go through every village/community in the county (and not only
to within one kilometre of a village, as was the case till then) and to offer
subsidised transportation services, for which the county allocated 10 million
yuan annually. The official deadline to complete this network was the end
of 2011, a goal interviewees from the transportation bureau were confident
of meeting. This excellent transportation network was expected to enable
villagers to conveniently commute to work by bus every day while still living
in their rural communities. 
The transition from rural villages to urban-like communities embodies sig-
nificant changes in villagers’ lives. According to local plans, in most cases
where several villages are merged a new community’s population is ex-
pected to reach 2,000-4,000 inhabitants, whereas the average village in
Chenggu currently only contains several hundred people. Often a new res-
idential community, as in the cities, is surrounded by walls, accentuating its
boundaries, its incorporation of villagers, and its integral identity vis-à-vis
other communities. Inside the community multi-storey apartment buildings
stand side by side. 
All of the new apartments I visited in Chenggu were equipped with granite
or tile floors and with modern facilities such as running water, solar water
heaters, modern kitchens with methane gas for cooking, hygienic toilets,
internet facilities, air conditioners, and in some of the villages even central
heating systems. These amenities contrast sharply with the old, dirty, crude,
and very basic facilities in the rural houses villagers had left behind. 
All of the paths leading to and between the houses inside the community’s
jurisdiction were paved, a sharp contrast to the muddy-after-rain appear-
ance of old-fashioned villages. As in the cities, local officials made the new
living environments cleaner and greener. Trees, shrubs, and flowers were
planted along the main roads and public areas, and garbage disposal facili-
ties were introduced or improved. Streetlights were installed along the main
roads, and in some cases surveillance cameras have been installed in the
residential communities “to ensure the villagers’ safety.” 
Public squares and sport facilities such as croquet courts, basketball courts,
and outdoor sports facilities have been introduced in each rural community.
Reading rooms have been constructed, offering reading material in residents’
leisure time. Small-scale supermarkets have also been built, significantly
larger than the previous grocery stores that operated in the villages, easing
the previous inconvenience of buying daily products outside the village in
the township seat or at rural markets. Often retirement homes have been
built as well, to which villagers can move after the age of 60.
Service centres have been constructed where residents can submit appli-
cations relating to issues such as birth control and land and residential ap-
provals, which previously were accessed only in the township seat. This not
only benefits the villagers but also reduces pressure on the township ad-
ministration. Other services include local policing, civil mediation, welfare
support, social security, economic assistance to those in need, pre-schools,
schools, and health clinics offering doctors and drugstore services.
Notwithstanding these many advantages, moving to apartments may also
embody adverse changes in villagers’ living habits and customs. Apartments
are often smaller than traditional rural housing. Social networks may be in-
terrupted since people in most cases find themselves with new neighbours.
Villagers no longer have an internal courtyard, which had many uses, such
as corralling livestock, planting vegetables for self-consumption, or as stor-
age place. When people move to a new area, they may find it less conven-
ient than before, for example if they live far from their agricultural land.
Finally, in most of the villages I visited in Chenggu, people are expected to
move before getting compensation for their old houses or confiscated agri-
cultural land. In light of all these factors, one may wonder, why do they
agree to move? 
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Photo 3 – An urban-like residential community in Chenggu
County. © Lior Rosenberg
The following is based on the many conversations I had with villagers in
Chenggu. First and foremost, villagers move because they perceive the shift
from the “old” and backward villages to living in a modern and hygienic en-
vironment as a “fair deal,” even if that means living in smaller housing units.
In addition, in developed Chenggu, villagers acknowledge the importance
of saving land as a means for further industrialisation and wealth accumu-
lation. A third factor refers to perceptions. During my conversations it be-
came clear that for many villagers the transition from rural houses to
apartments symbolises a transition from backwardness to modernity, and
living in apartments is “living like in the cities,” a notion embraced by many
of the villagers. Lastly, all the communities that I visited were built fairly
close to the original “old” villages. The new location therefore was not per-
ceived by the villagers as an issue. They were still living close to their land,
and even though previous neighbours may not share the same building, vil-
lagers still live together in the same residential compound and maintain so-
cial networks as easily as before. In new communities where several villages
were expected to reside together, the new residential buildings are allocated
per village to ensure that villagers from the same village continue to reside
together. In many of the new multi-storey buildings, warehousing space and
enclosed parking lots are allocated along with the apartments (or can be
bought separately), providing even better storage than before. Thus local
officials’ positive perception of establishing residential communities coin-
cided with the viewpoint not only of their superiors but also of many of the
villagers.  
Yet some villagers harbour suspicions about the new lifestyle. Regardless
of individual economic conditions that may impede the possibility of buying
a new apartment, there were other causes for hesitation. Villagers may con-
sider it more convenient to stay in their old ramshackle ground-level house
than to live in a modern clean apartment on the fifth floor without an ele-
vator (if they could not afford to buy a more expensive unit on a lower
floor). In addition, some simply prefer living amidst rural nature rather than
in dense urban-like residential compounds. Especially in villages in which
inhabitants are more dependent on agriculture and other rural undertakings
for income, people were disturbed by the thought of living without the mul-
tipurpose internal yard or raising livestock in a separate area far from their
watchful eye. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, my overall impression was that cases of
reluctance were a minority and mostly occur before and during the early
stages of the transition. As long as they can afford it, ultimately most vil-
lagers seem to support leaving their old village. Normally when a new com-
munity is being built, the construction is conducted in several stages and
not all apartment buildings are constructed at the same time. There are sev-
eral reasons for this, among them financial constraints. Moving whole vil-
lages requires significant financial investment, while gradual construction
can ensure a circulation of liquid finances. Lack of available land is another
important reason. Often there is not enough land available for the entire
construction project. In these cases, some of the apartment buildings are
constructed first, and then after villagers have moved and their old houses
were demolished, new apartment buildings are constructed on the evacu-
ated land. Another important reason is to ensure that apartments do not
stay empty when construction is over. In some cases villagers who wish to
move may be asked to commit first, and only after a considerable number
of households have committed will construction start. In other villages, of-
ficials were confident that by the time the first stage of construction was
finished there would be enough households wishing to inhabit the new
buildings. Moreover, officials believed that the best strategy to reduce cases
of reluctance is to show sceptics a completed building so that they can wit-
ness the many benefits embedded in living in modern residences. In all of
the villages I visited that were in a period of transition, the first to move
were normally the villages’ officials and young people, while others moved
after learning from the experience of those who had already moved. 
Officials tended to disparage the reluctant movers. For them, the new res-
idences represent a new dawn for the countryside. The entrance to the new
communities symbolises the entrance to modernity and to a better world.
Why would a rational person resist such an opportunity? Especially in the
richer areas of the county, officials also tend to disparage the notion that
families face economic constraints, and in many villages and townships I
was told that these simply do not exist (many villagers, though, have
claimed the opposite). When asked about the possibility that villagers may
find themselves residing next to unwanted neighbours, an official in one of
Chenggu’s most developed communities was decisive in his answer: “Hasn’t
this occurred in the cities as well? If you don’t like your neighbour you can
always buy an apartment in another building.” (26) Officials made very clear
that for them any reluctance to move was first and foremost a manifesta-
tion of backwardness of the villagers. Urbanising the rural is not only about
constructing urban-like residential compounds and improving services; it is
also about urbanising the people’s minds and the creation of “new villagers”
of “higher quality” (suzhi 素质).
Urbanising the rural in Beian county, Anhui
Province
After the announcement of the BNSC scheme in 2006, officials in Beian
started to introduce better infrastructure and public amenities in villages.
These included paving all roads inside and between the villages, which in
Beian were all dirt roads before 2006; installing running water; greening and
beautifying the villages; introducing and/or improving garbage disposal fa-
cilities; and introducing cultural facilities such as public squares, basketball
courts, outdoor sports facilities, and reading rooms. Yet unlike in Chenggu,
officials in Beian were reluctant to construct new residential communities
and multi-storey apartment building compounds. Why have officials in
Beian not welcomed this as officials in Chenggu did? Why would they resist
constructing “a gateway to modernity”?
The first important reason was that Beian was not included in the national
list of experimental counties to construct rural communities. Without pres-
sure from above, it was left to county officials to decide, and they have
mainly used local economic factors to decide their development. Officials
in Beian assumed, probably rightly, that requiring people to move to new
homes or apartments will invoke serious resentment, possibly even social
unrest, an outcome they try to avoid as much as possible. They suspect two
main groups of residents would resist buying new housing and leaving their
old villages. The first group consists of those who recently constructed a
new house. As a less industrialised and less economically developed county,
wealth accumulation in Beian is a slower process than in Chenggu, and
many of the county’s villagers have built new houses only recently. In most
cases these houses are quite large (most of them are two-storey houses)
and still in good condition. These villagers therefore do not feel the need to
move. Moreover, unlike officials in Chenggu, officials in Beian perceive buy-
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ing new housing, which costs about the same as in Chenggu although in-
comes in Beian are lower, as a gigantic expense for households. Thus, they
estimate that the villagers are unlikely to agree to move without getting
adequate compensation, which the county in its current financial condition
cannot afford paying.
The second group officials consider potentially problematic are the
younger villagers. As the county cannot provide employment opportunities
to all of its inhabitants, about a third of its entire population are migrant
workers who are absent from the village for most of the year. Officials es-
timate that they are likely to refuse to buy new houses that they cannot
use. Also, unlike in Chenggu where saved land can be translated into further
wealth accumulation both for rural inhabitants and the local government,
in most Beian villages the realistic scenario is agricultural land extension.
Taking into account the unprofitability of agriculture for villagers and even
more so to local governments’ revenue, the county government decided
that developing the local labour market and attracting investors were much
more urgently needed than reclaiming agriculture land and urbanising out-
migrating communities. 
Finally, as Beian villages do not enjoy any significant collective income
and therefore do not have collective revenues to support redevelopment of
public village facilities, the success of any redevelopment is heavily depend-
ent upon the willingness of the villagers to pay for new infrastructure them-
selves. Constructing new residential communities would entail creating even
more expensive new infrastructure and amenities. Officials in Beian were
very sensitive to not over-burden the villagers with new expenses.
Instead, efforts were being made by the county government to develop
its rural towns, and especially to develop the township of G.H., where the
county government is located, into the main urban, commercial, and indus-
trial centre. The hope is that this will bring many of the county’s migrant
workers back home and that people will (voluntarily) leave their overpop-
ulated backward villages and move into the township’s new residential
areas, some of which are still under construction. The plan, according to of-
ficial documents, is that 80% of the county’s population will eventually re-
side in the county’s rural towns, with access to the towns’ facilities,
infrastructure, and public amenities. Signs of change are already noticeable.
According to local statistics, in 2007, only 10% of the county’s population
held a non-rural household registration. Yet in the township of G.H., over
40% of the township’s population already hold a non-rural household reg-
istration. Under the circumstances of underdevelopment, the official view
in Beian was clear – first comes “urbanisation from below,” and only then
can the rural be urbanised. 
Officials fully acknowledged that industrialisation and developing local
labour markets may take a long time, as Anhui is not a highly industrialised
province. Rather than constructing new residential communities, they have
happily embraced the idea of less ambitiously focusing on enhancing “com-
munity services” with a goal of offering better urban-like public amenities
and services in the villages. 
Discussion and conclusions
When the official call to construct new rural communities was aired in
2006, Chenggu was already an economically developed county. Its labour
market offered employment opportunities not only to its own inhabitants
but also to many thousands of migrant workers, who were flowing into the
county from all over the country. About a quarter of its population held
non-rural hukou and about half of the county’s total population lived in the
county’s rural towns, (27) enjoying excellent infrastructure, public amenities,
and markets. Public transport and an excellent road network had already
been established interconnecting all rural towns and villages. Under these
circumstances, villagers and officials welcomed constructing urban-like res-
idential areas with modern facilities, accessible high-quality services, and
better economic structure as a natural continuation of the county’s two
decades of economic development.
While officials in Chenggu were excited about the construction of new
rural communities, in less developed Beian County officials rejected the idea.
To be sure, as in Chenggu, officials in Beian identified the impediments of
the “old” countryside as a problem and strongly believed that a “new” coun-
tryside is needed. They did not reject the idea of constructing rural residen-
tial communities as embodying potential benefits, but they questioned
whether it was appropriate for their current local conditions. Since Beian
lags behind Chenggu in terms of economic development, its present worries
coincide with Chenggu’s past ones. The official view in Beian is to promote
prosperity in the county through further development of town local labour
markets. As in Chenggu, officials in Beian value urbanisation to boost the
local economy and modernisation – but in their view, under the county’s
current circumstances, this should be a product of market forces much more
than through direct state intervention. For them, it is not time to urbanise
the villages yet. 
Provincial levels recognised the need for a prosperous rural base to suc-
cessfully create new rural communities. In 2005, for example, on the eve of
BNSC and before the Party officially aired the national call to construct rural
communities, the province of Shandong published a document in which it
articulated its main policies for the impending BNSC scheme. All counties
were divided into three groups by their level of GDP. Counties that were in-
cluded in the first group of highest GDP in the province (one of which was
Chenggu) were expected to concentrate industries in industrial zones, to
concentrate population in the counties’ and central townships’ seats, and
to concentrate villagers into rural residential communities. Rural and urban
systems were to be better integrated in terms of economy, infrastructure,
employment, social welfare systems, and environment protection. Often
this is met by locating residential communities adjacent to rural towns as
de facto suburbs. 
The province’s expectations for the third group of counties with the lowest
GDP were significantly less demanding and more appropriate to their poor
economic conditions. These included improving the physical living environ-
ment in the villages, improving villagers’ professional skills, improving basic
infrastructure and amenities inside the villages, and improving village offi-
cials’ leadership. Unlike the developed counties, where the provincial focus
was on integration between rural and urban communities, here the focus is
on improving local conditions inside the villages, with the hope that with
time they will be able to improve their conditions and meet the province’s
requirements for its developed counties. (28)
The cases of Chenggu and Beian, which fully coincide with Shandong’s
schema, make it clear that while imposing urban models of residence may
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be appropriate for developed rural areas, this does not fit local conditions
elsewhere. 
Migrant workers, for example, may refuse to buy new housing that they
cannot use. In areas where agriculture is still a major source of household
income, and in hilly or other areas where villages are extensively dispersed,
concentrating the population in new residential compounds may invoke se-
rious difficulties for those displaced. Even in developed Chenggu, where ac-
cording to local statistics 70% of the villagers’ income is derived from
non-agricultural resources, (29) and where non-rural employment is highly
available and accessible, villagers sometimes worried about storing agricul-
tural tools or living removed from their land and livestock. 
Moreover, construction of residential communities requires significant fi-
nancial investment. According to a local document, by the end of 2009,
total investment in the construction of rural communities in Chenggu al-
ready totalled a billion yuan. Clearly, it would have been impossible in most
rural counties to meet the high standards of Chenggu, especially bearing in
mind that most localities in China are heavily in debt. 
What also serves as a serious concern is the embedded lack of trans-
parency in the Chinese political system and the inability of higher levels to
control implementers and to suppress corruption and embezzlement by
local officials. (30) This is worrisome, as the creation of new rural communities
necessarily involves large-scale construction projects and land transfers, two
main sources of local corruption in contemporary China. There already is
evidence of local officials taking advantage of the call to construct new rural
communities. This includes, among other things, illegal sale of villagers’ land,
deprivation of villagers’ basic legal rights, inadequate compensation for loss
of land or housing, forcing villagers into debt to buy new housing against
their will, expelling villagers from their homes and in some cases placing
them in provisional housing lacking basic facilities, and illegal shifts of prop-
erty from villagers to companies in which local cadres or their kin have fi-
nancial interests. (31)
Lastly, as a statist venture, constructing rural communities may easily tilt
towards meeting state goals much more than villagers’ well-being. Most
villagers whom I conversed with in Chenggu made it very clear that no one
has asked them whether they would like to leave their villages or to move
to communities and to multi-storey apartment buildings. Indeed, it seems
that villagers’ ability to influence local officials’ decision-making was slim.
County construction bureau officials told me that geographical location was
their main consideration in deciding which villages were to be concentrated
into new communities and reside together. Whether the villagers agreed or
not was clearly not their concern. In several communities, villagers said that
their opinion was never asked regarding housing models or what was to be
included in the community’s jurisdiction. In many aspects, grassroots offi-
cials’ discretion was also limited. It is not surprising that in both Chenggu
and Beian, itemising what was to be included in the shaping of villages/com-
munities reveals many similarities, such as greenification, introducing sports
facilities, e.g., basketball courts and outdoor facilities, etc. These were all ar-
ticulated by the central government and by higher levels of the local state
as a compulsory formula to establish a new countryside. In both counties,
grassroots officials were provided with detailed lists from higher levels of
the government itemising what is to be constructed, with little discretion
left for the implementers. Excluding villagers from participating in decision-
making and counting on urban wisdom to solve rural problems risks serious
misunderstanding of local rural circumstances. The more rural, the greater
the potential misapprehension.
Yet it seems that central policymakers are determined to expand the con-
struction of rural communities and at a rapid pace. In October 2010, a na-
tional conference was held in Ningxia entitled “Obvious effects of the
national experimental work in (the construction of) rural communities.” The
ranks of the participants left no doubt about its importance. These included
the Deputy Minister of Civil Affairs and leaders from every province and city.
Senior officials praised experiments in constructing new rural communities
at the conference. The Deputy Minister stressed the serious shortage of serv-
ices in rural China, conveying a call to create rural communities in 30% of
China’s counties by the end of 2011. The conference called for a gradual
expansion of the construction of rural communities to “remote areas with
poor natural conditions and transport,” located in “areas with poor eco-
nomic conditions, forestry areas, pastoral areas, fishing areas, and other rural
areas.” (32) Although the word “gradually” was used, the schedule announced
at the conference left no time for idling. By 2015, all rural areas in the coun-
try were expected to carry out the construction of new rural communities,
with more than 60% of the communities basically constructed. By 2020,
all rural communities nationwide are to be built, offering communal social
life with orderly management and complete services. (33)
A year later, a Ministry of Civil Affairs document referred to the rural com-
munities as “guaranteeing that hundreds of millions of farmers enjoy the
fruits of reform and development.” (34) This expectation of a rapid nationwide
construction of rural service communities is of great concern. As noted ear-
lier, one of the main reasons for officials constructing urban-like dense res-
idential communities was to improve the provision of services, which could
not have been provided efficiently when the rural populace was scattered
in the countryside. The earlier-mentioned demands of the Ministry of Civil
Affairs that all services must be provided within a radius of no more than
2-3 kilometres and no more than 20 minutes’ walking distance serves as
another driver of concentration regardless of local circumstances. 
No doubt such clear messages by high-ranking figures do not fall on deaf
ears. By 2011, most of the townships in Chenggu that I researched had al-
ready changed local regulations. Construction of any other style of housing
apart from multi-storey buildings was officially banned. These included
townships in which officials had explained to me only two years earlier that
they would never impose any model of residence on the villagers, as this
contradicts their own beliefs about what the new socialist countryside en-
tails. Two years later the die had been cast – the rural scene is to be changed
forever.
The construction of rural communities has become an ambitious nation-
wide policy that seeks to change China’s countryside dramatically through
statist social engineering, relocating populations, and imposition of urban
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settings on rural communities. The idea of imposing urban models on rural
communities as an administrative means to solve rural problems is provoca-
tive. Merging villages is even more so. According to officials in Chenggu, after
all of the villagers have been moved, the next step would be merging them
politically and financially under a unified community leadership. As each vil-
lage has its own economic resources and as some have been more successful
than others, such a move would likely encounter bitter resistance. Some of-
ficials in Chenggu in a burst of candour admitted that thus far no one in the
county had succeeded in resolving this impending problem. 
As the cases of Chenggu and Beian clearly demonstrate, constructing rural
residential communities fits prosperous communities’ circumstances. But as
the policy gains popularity in the eyes of central officials, it raises real con-
cerns for the future of most of China’s rural population. If handled wisely, it
may benefit both villagers and the state. If not, it may easily become a statist
venture of predation and a source of tension and rural discontent. How the
program will affect China is still to be seen, and still for the state to decide.
z Lior Rosenberg has completed a PhD dissertation at The Australian
National University. This year he has taught on Chinese society at
Tel Aviv University.
The Australian National University, Acton ACT 0200, Australia
(lior.rosenberg@anu.edu.au).
N o . 2 0 1 3 / 3  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 71
Lior Rosenberg – Urbanising the Rural
